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28th Annual AICPA Conference
Current SEC Development
December 6, 2000
Arthur Siegel, Executive Director
Independence Standards Board

Introduction
It is a pleasure to be here again to speak about the activities of the Independence
Standards Board. Like everyone else, I must remind you, however, that my remarks
reflect my own views, and not necessarily those of the ISB or of individual Board
members.
I will spend my time today giving you an overview of the ISB’s recently issued proposed
conceptual framework for auditor independence.
The project began two years ago in recognition of a need to remedy the existing jumble
of confusing independence rules and regulations that applied to public companies and
their auditors, many in the form of interpretations issued in response to specific
independence questions. The guidance in those interpretations, issued over the years and
under changing circumstances, sometimes conflicted and lacked theoretical consistency,
and in any event was difficult to apply to different circumstances or to new situations.
The framework is intended to assist the Board is setting sound and consistent principlebased standards. While the framework will not answer specific independence questions,
it will help practitioners, investors, client management, audit committee members,
regulators, and other standard setters understand the significance of auditor independence
and provide a common language, so that those involved in the independence debate can
contribute most effectively to the development of ISB standards.
The proposed framework is the product of a thoughtful, open process involving a wide
variety of contributors. As you may recall, a Discussion Memorandum was issued last
February on issues that were essential to the development of the framework; the comment
period ended May 31st.
The Project Directors, Professor Hank Jaenicke of Drexel University, and Professor Alan
Glazer of Franklin & Marshall College, summarized the comments received and prepared
issue summaries which were reviewed and debated with the ISB staff, Tom Dunfee, the
Board’s consultant on ethics, and the Project Task Force – a group of twenty plus
investor group representatives, audit committee members, academics, international
independence standard setters, preparers, practitioners, lawyers, and regulators – before
being brought to the Board Oversight Task Force and the full Board for deliberation. The

proposed framework document was also reviewed by the Project Task Force for clarity
and completeness, before the Board approved its issuance last week.
Overview of the Framework
The framework consists of:
• a definition and goal of auditor independence;
• independence concepts that are elements of a risk model for auditor independence;
and
• some basic principles.
The model for independence standard setters contains the following key steps:
• Identify threats to auditor independence and their significance;
• Evaluate the effectiveness of potential safeguards, including restrictions on activities
and relationships with audit clients; and
• Determine an acceptable level of independence risk – the risk that the auditor’s
independence will be compromised.
In performing this analysis, the standard setter is to consider the costs and benefits of
regulation. Finally, the framework directs us to consider the views of investors, other
users of financial information, and other interested parties when making independence
decisions, recognizing that an auditor’s independence does not serve the auditor or his or
her client well, if no one believes in it.
Definition of Auditor Independence
The framework defines auditor independence as “freedom from those pressures and other
factors that compromise, or can reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s
ability to make unbiased audit decisions.”
The definition was the most difficult and contentious item in the development of the
framework. We wanted to ensure that the definition described a state of independence
that is attainable. That is, we did not want to articulate an ideal that human beings could
not achieve, and in any event may be unnecessary. Therefore, the definition does not
require the auditor to be completely free of all factors that affect the ability to make
unbiased audit decisions, but only free from those that rise to the level of compromising
that ability.
Pressures and other factors arise from a wide variety of activities, relationships, and other
circumstances as well as from various personal qualities and characteristics of auditors
that may be subconscious as well as conscious sources of bias.

We also felt very strongly that the definition should make clear that auditor independence
is more than just compliance with the rules - we believe that auditing is a profession with
ideals that compel adherence to the spirit as well as the letter of the law.
Finally, while the definition call for an introspective evaluation of independence, the
auditor must also assess how activities and relationships with the audit client would
appear to others. The guidance explains that the auditor should consider the “rationallybased expectations of well-informed investors and other users.”
Goal of Auditor Independence
The role of a goal is to guide the Board in setting standards and assist other independence
decision makers in analyzing independence issues in the absence of standards or rules.
The framework describes the goal of independence as “to support user reliance on the
financial reporting process and to enhance capital market efficiency.”
The goal therefore looks beyond the immediate benefit of the auditor’s independence –
unbiased audit decisions – to broader targets. In other words, standards that reduce
independence risk slightly, but carry unintended consequences that harm the quality of
financial reporting or capital market efficiency, do not serve the public interest.
Threats and Safeguards
Threats to independence are sources of potential bias that may compromise, or may
reasonably be expected to compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit
decisions.
Threats are posed by various types of activities and relationships with audit clients, or by
other circumstances.
The framework provides examples of threats – following the model developed by
European standard setters - but the list is not meant to be either mutually exclusive or
exhaustive.
Safeguards are controls, including prohibitions and restrictions, that mitigate or eliminate
threats to auditor independence.
Independence Risk
Independence risk is the risk that threats to auditor’s independence, to the extent that they
are not mitigated by safeguards, compromise, or can reasonably be expected to
compromise, an auditor’s ability to make unbiased audit decisions.

Incorporation of Perceptions
One of the most controversial aspects of the auditor independence debate has been the
role that “appearance” should play in setting standards. The “appearance” concept –
though not well defined – is ingrained in the existing independence literature. But what
does it mean to “appear” independent, and how do you operationalize this concept?
The Board considered a variety of ways to assess public perceptions regarding proposed
standards, and to incorporate those perceptions in its decision-making process. These
included setting standards based on the views of all stakeholders – standards by “majority
rule,” if you will. Another approach would be to set standards based on the views of a
hypothetical group – say “reasonable, fully-informed users of financial information.”
The difficulty in this approach, of course, is inferring the views of the hypothetical group.
A third approach, and the one that the Board adopted, is to solicit the views of all
interested parties, but to develop standards based on the Board’s judgment about how
best to meet the goal of auditor independence. The Board would neither ignore
appearances nor base its decisions solely on the perceptions of interested parties. And
while the Board’s policies require, and the framework principles endorse, the Board’s
consideration of the views of all interested parties in auditor independence, the definition
and goal emphasize that independence is designed to promote the reliability and
credibility of financial information for investors and other users.
The Value of the Framework
The model for analyzing independence issues and setting standards suggested by the
framework is not rocket science – but it is a disciplined approach to evaluating human
motivations, competing incentives, and the sometimes conflicting roles of auditors and
the management of their audit clients, so that effective restrictions or other safeguards can
be designed to protect the independence of the auditor. In designing these restrictions or
safeguards, the framework reminds us that independence is not the ultimate goal – we
must not do anything to thwart quality audits, to discourage user reliance on audited
financial statements, or to detract from capital market efficiency. In other words, the
framework directs us to look at the big picture, and to consider the unintended
consequences of regulation. Only in that way, will we serve the public’s true interest.
*****
A copy of the Exposure Draft is included in your materials. You can also obtain a copy
from our website at www.cpaindependence.org. We urge all of you to comment - the
comment period ends February 28, 2001.
Thank you for your time and attentiveness. I’d be glad to try to answer any questions you
may have.

